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Economic Attitudes, Social Attitudes
and Their Psychological
Underpinnings – A Study of the
Finnish Political Elite
Jan-Erik Lönnqvist1* and Matias Kivikangas2
1 Swedish School of Social Science, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland, 2 KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
We investigated the relation between economic and social attitudes and the
psychological underpinnings of these attitudes in candidates (N = 9515) in the Finnish
2017 municipal elections. In this politically elite sample, right-wing economic attitudes
and social conservatism were positively correlated (r = 0.41), and this correlation
was predominantly driven by those on the economic left being socially liberal, and
vice versa. In terms of underlying psychological processes, consistent with dual
process models of political ideology, the anti-egalitarian aspect of social dominance
orientation was more strongly associated with right-wing economic attitudes, and
the conventionalism and aggression aspects of right-wing authoritarianism with social
conservatism. Our results show that even in a non-United States context in which
the masses organize their political attitudes on two independent dimensions, these
dimensions are moderately aligned among certain parts of the political elite, and that
the political attitudes of the political elite can be traced to underlying psychological
motivations. We argue that equality concerns could play a role in explaining why the
left-right and liberal-conservative dimensions are more strongly aligned among those on
the left and those more liberal.
Keywords: political attitudes, political elite, left-right dimension elections, liberal-conservative, authoritarianism,
social dominance orientation, dual process models, political ideology
INTRODUCTION
Although political psychology is often defined as an interdisciplinary field in which psychological
concepts and methods are used to test theories about elite and mass political behavior, most of
the empirical research has focused on mass publics. Moreover, much of this research has been
conducted in a two-party system – the United States. From this literature, we know that (1)
economic and social attitudes are more strongly aligned among the highly educated and politically
engaged, (2) right-wing people tend to show more heterogeneity in their social attitudes, and (3)
economic and social attitudes have distinct psychological underpinnings, an idea often referred to
as the dual process model of ideology. The purpose of the present research was to extend upon this
literature by investigating to what extent similar patterns can be found in the political elite in a
typical Western European multi-party system.
More specifically, we investigated the relation between economic and social attitudes and the
psychological underpinnings of these attitudes among the almost 10,000 candidates in the Finnish
2017 municipal elections who had responded to the two largest voting advice applications (VAAs)
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hosted by the largest national newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat,
and by the Finnish National Broadcasting company, YLE.
The former application included measures of economic
and social attitudes and the latter included items adapted
from measures of right-wing authoritarianism and social
dominance orientation, two of the currently most researched
conceptualizations of the psychological underpinnings of
political attitudes.
The Economic and Social Dimensions of
Political Attitudes
Prior research has provided conflicting accounts regarding the
extent to which economic and social political attitudes tend
to be aligned on one dimension. Although the language and
rhetoric of the political elite – politicians, social scientists,
philosophers, and the media – often operationalizes political
attitudes as a unidimensional continuum, ranging from left to
right, or liberal to conservative, research on public opinion
has since the 1960s suggested that this may be a poor
description of the political attitudes of the masses (Converse,
1964). A considerable body of work now demonstrates that
political attitudes are often multifaceted, better described by two
dimensions–an economic/fiscal dimension and a social/cultural
dimension (Lane, 1962; Conover and Feldman, 1981; Duckitt,
2001; Weber and Federico, 2007).
Regarding the economic dimension of attitudes, right-wing
(as opposed to left-wing) economic policies focus on a large role
for free markets and individual action, rejection or retrenchment
of the welfare state, whereby the state’s role is limited to the
provision of public goods and the correction of market failures,
and general economic orthodoxy, revolving around the ideas
of limited public finance, balanced government budgets, and
strong property rights (e.g., Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann
et al., 2006). By contrast, left-wing economic ideas build on
the necessity of regulating the free market. Such ideas include
the expansion of the welfare state and education (Bobbio,
1996), claims for economic planning and market regulation, and
also more radical ideas about the nationalization of enterprises
and government control of the economy (Budge et al., 2001;
Klingemann et al., 2006; Jahn, 2011). In the Finnish context,
differences between the left and the right often revolve around
taxes, public welfare expenditure, privatization, and deregulation
(Karvonen, 2014).
Social conservatism (as opposed to liberalism) can broadly
speaking be defined as “resistance to change and the tendency
to prefer safe, traditional and conventional forms of institutions
and behavior” (Wilson, 1973, p. 4). A central tenet of social
conservatism is that for social harmony, a certain amount
of consistency needs to be maintained in the social fabric.
Social conservatism emphasizes the importance of preserving
ties that bind people together, such as family, religion and
customs, making traditional morality and a national way
of life central for social conservatism (Budge et al., 2001;
Klingemann et al., 2006). In the Finnish context, typical
dividing issues between social conservatives and liberals are
immigration, same-sex marriage, same-sex adoption, the role
of religion and traditional morality in politics, and patriotism
(Karvonen, 2014).
Determinants of the Alignment Between
Economic and Social Attitudes
The extent to which the economic and social dimensions of
political attitudes are aligned has been shown to depend on both
cultural and individual-level characteristics (Jost et al., 2009).
The two dimensions of political attitudes have been historically
intertwined: As Western societies have moved incrementally
toward greater equality, progress has meant increased
egalitarianism, whereas resistance to change has generally been
associated with maintenance of traditional, more hierarchical
forms of social organization. However, in the last decades,
the organization of political attitudes has been argued to have
become increasingly two-dimensional (Bornschier, 2010).
Indeed, using survey data from 99 nations, a recent study
found that the alignment of right-wing economic attitudes
(acceptance of inequality) with social conservatism (adherence
to tradition) is globally uncommon (Malka et al., 2017). The
unidimensional continuum that tends to organize the language
and rhetoric of the political elite is more likely to be found within
modern and developed nations, and even there, primarily in
two-party or two-bloc systems, such as the United States or the
United Kingdom (Malka et al., 2017). Research employing the
nationally representative data sets of the World Values Survey
shows that also in Finland, as well as many other Western
European countries, the correlation between the economic and
social dimensions of political attitudes is virtually zero among
the mass public (Malka et al., 2017). However, this may not
necessarily be the case among the political elite.
At least in some contexts, alignment between the economic
and social dimensions is conditional on a person’s level of
political engagement. In the United States, those who are highly
educated (Sidanius and Duffy, 1988) and highly politically
engaged (Sidanius and Duffy, 1988; Federico and Schneider,
2007) are the most likely to organize their economic and social
attitudes along one dimension, whereas those low in political
engagement are more likely to adopt a “mixed bag” of attitudes
(for a review, see Feldman, 2013). This has generally been argued
to be a consequence of the more educated and politically engaged
following the elite political competition that in a two-party
system such as the United States tends to occur along only one
dimension (Feldman and Johnston, 2014). We will investigate
whether political engagement is similarly associated with a more
unidimensional structuring of political attitudes in a context
such as the Finnish context, in which two virtually uncorrelated
dimensions are necessary to describe the political attitudes of
the mass public.
The degree of alignment between economic and social
attitudes may also depend on where on the left-right continuum
the person falls. In the United States, as in other two-party
systems, economic right-wing attitudes tend to be rather
strongly aligned with social conservatism (Malka et al., 2017).
However, among those on the right there are groups of
people with very different political, psychological, moral, and
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demographic profiles (Ellis and Stimson, 2012; Weber and
Federico, 2013; Feldman and Johnston, 2014; Davis et al.,
2016). The heterogeneity of the right on social issues has in
the United States been argued to be due to the mobilization
of the religious right in the 1970s and President Reagan’s
ability to appeal to both economically and socially conservative
voters, attracting these previously separate factions to the
Republican Party (Lienesch, 1982; Dionne, 1991; Micklethwait
and Wooldridge, 2005). This type of historically contextual and
particular explanation would imply that the heterogeneity of the
right is specific to the United States context. However, there
could be something more general about this pattern, and we will
investigate to what extent it applies to the Finnish political elite.
Psychological Underpinnings of the
Holding of Political Attitudes
The present research also sought to contribute to the current
renaissance on research on how certain types of ideas appeal
to certain types of people. Basic psychological motivations
and tendencies have often been argued to underlie ideological
differences. Two of the most researched individual difference
predictors of political attitudes are right-wing authoritarianism
(RWA; Adorno et al., 1950) and social domination orientation
(SDO; Sidanius and Pratto, 1999), both of which refer to the
acceptance of various forms of inequality and domination. People
scoring high in RWA believe in an inherently chaotic world
where order and stability must be created by submitting to
a strong authority. Although RWA was originally thought of
as a more unitary construct (Adorno et al., 1950), subsequent
personality scales designed to measure RWA have tended to
assess three intercorrelated facets that together form RWA.
The most popular of these scales, Altemeyer’s (Altemeyer,
1981, 1988) RWA scale, encompassed three distinct content
areas, that is, Conventionalism, Authoritarian Submission, and
Authoritarian Aggression. In this and similar conceptualizations
of RWA (Duckitt et al., 2010; Mavor et al., 2010; Duckitt and
Bizumic, 2013), Conventionalism (or Traditionalism) refers to
the concern for maintaining or establishing normative consensus
in groups and motivates attitudes such as acting in line with
ingroup norms, Authoritarian Submission (Conservatism) refers
to obeying people or institutions that promote norm compliance,
and Authoritarian Aggression refers to punishing those who are
breaking the norms of the ingroup. In the original formulation,
however, authoritarianism was restricted to submissiveness and
aggressiveness (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 228). Consistent with this
formulation, Authoritarian Conventionalism has recently been
argued to be best understood as a form of submissiveness to rules
as well as to rulers (Smith and Hanley, 2018).
SDO was originally defined as the preference for group-based
hierarchy and inequality. However, there is now mounting
evidence that SDO needs to be conceptually divided into
preference for systems where high-status groups dominate
low-status groups (SDO Dominance) and preference for
systems where inequality is maintained by hierarchy-enhancing
ideologies and policies (SDO Anti-egalitarianism; Ho et al.,
2015). Whereas SDO Dominance is related to blatant racism
and other overtly aggressive intergroup phenomena, SDO
Anti-egalitarianism has been defined as representing opposition
to equality between groups, as supported by an interrelated
network of subtle hierarchy-enhancing beliefs and social policies,
and manifested in an affinity for ideologies and policies that
maintain inequality, such as meritocracy.
Dual process models of political ideology argue that SDO
and RWA constitute two distinct psychological motivations that
underlie economic right-wing attitudes, and social conservatism,
respectively (e.g., Duckitt et al., 2002; Duriez and Van Hiel,
2002; Duriez et al., 2005). Prior empirical research on the
dual process model has focused on the mass public, and we
sought to investigate whether a similar pattern can be found
in the political elite. Some research suggests that the politically
engaged may show higher consistency between their pre-political
characteristics, such as their basic psychological motivations, and
their political ideology, with the more knowledgeable being able
to better select the ideology that satisfies their psychological needs
(Federico and Goren, 2009; Federico et al., 2009; Malka et al.,
2012). To what extent RWA and SDO underlie the political
attitudes of political elites has not previously been investigated.
The Purpose of the Present Research
Founding our study on the fundamental idea that there exist
two separate dimensions of political attitudes – the economic
and social dimensions (for a recent review and empirical
support, see Malka et al., 2017) – we sought to investigate
the extent to which these two dimensions are aligned among
the almost 10,000 candidates in the Finnish 2017 municipal
elections. Research conducted in the context of the United States
two-party system suggests that the two dimensions are aligned
among the political elite and that the alignment between the
dimensions is stronger among those on the economic left
and those more socially liberal, as compared to those on the
economic right and more socially conservative. The novelty of
our research lies in investigating these ideas in a multi-party
context in which the correlation between the economic and
social dimensions of political attitudes is virtually zero in the
mass public (Malka et al., 2017). Our results could thus, first,
help determine whether there among the political elite exists
an association between the two dimensions of political attitudes
even in contexts in which the mass public thinks of them
as completely separate dimensions. Second, our results could
help clarify whether there is some generalizability to the result
that it is particularly those on the left and those socially
liberal among whom the two dimensions are interrelated, or
whether this pattern is specific to the United States. Third,
we sought to investigate the possible psychological motivations
underpinning political attitudes, or more precisely, whether
aspects of RWA and SDO are associated with social conservatism
and economic right-wing attitudes, respectively. The novelty of
this research thus lies in the non-United States multi-party setting
in which political attitudes are bi-dimensionally organized and
in the focus on the political elite. Focusing on the attitudes
of the political elite is by itself important – political elites
often dominate the political environment, influence the attitudes
and opinions of mass publics, and shape collective action
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(e.g., Statham and Geddes, 2006; Loizides, 2008); yet, there is very
little large-scale survey research on the attitudes of the elites.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants and Procedure
Participants were those 9515 (4164 female; 48.8%) candidates in
the Finnish 2017 municipal elections who had completed both the
voting application hosted by the Finnish National Broadcasting
company and the national newspaper Helsingin Sanomat. The
former included items pertaining to authoritarian tendencies,
and the latter included measures of right-wing economic
attitudes and social conservatism. Candidates responded to
the voting advice application before it was opened to the
general public and were not aware of how other candidates had
responded. The mean age of the candidates was 44.57 years
(SD = 12.96; range 18–87). There were in total 36,616 candidates
in the Finnish 2017 municipal elections. As compared to the
27,101 candidates who did not respond to the YLE and HS
voting advice applications, those who had completed both of
these voting applications (that is, our sample of 9515 candidates)
were somewhat younger (the mean age of all candidates was
50 years) and women were somewhat overrepresented (40% of
all candidates were women). All data is Open Data and available
from the Helsingin Sanomat1 and YLE2 websites. Although
the data is un-anonymous, local and national guidelines
did not require ethics approval because all data is open
access public data.
Highest education attained was coded into four categories,
with categories representing participants with no secondary
education (n = 222; 2.3%), with a vocational or high school
degree (n = 992; 10.4%), with a bachelor’s degree or university of
applied sciences degree (n = 2195; 23.1%), and participants with
higher than bachelor’s degree (n = 5045; 53.0%). Altogether 1061
participants did not report their education.
Political engagement was coded into four categories,
with categories representing no previous political experience
(n = 3081; 32.4%), activity in political party at the municipal
level (n = 3323; 34.9%), elected for a municipal office or council
(n = 2929; 30.8%), and elected in national elections (n = 142;
1.5%). Forty participants (0.4%) did not respond to this question.
Yearly income was entered in six categories, with categories
representing less than 20,000€ (n = 1418; 14.9%), 20,000–30,000€
(n = 1481; 15.6%), 30,000–50,000€ (n = 2689; 28.3%),
50,000–70,000€ (n = 979; 10.3%), 70,000–100,000€ (n = 384;
4.0%), and above 100,000€ (n = 148; 1.6%). A total of 2416
(25.4%) participants did not report their income. The average
yearly income in Finland in the year 2015 was 28,750€, with
around 40% earning below 20,000€, 20% earning 20,000–30,000€,
25% earning 30,000–50,000€, and the remaining 15% earning
above 50,000€. The lowest income bracket was thus somewhat




In general, candidates were somewhat higher educated and
had somewhat higher income than the population in general.
However, the differences were relatively small, and the candidates
do not constitute a socioeconomic elite. Municipal elections do
not involve significant constitutional office and do not attract
large scale media coverage. Only a small minority of candidates
are “career politicians” who are politicians by occupation or have
a history of active campaigning and public visibility.
Measures
The items assessing economic and social attitudes that were
used in the Helsingin Sanomat VAA were adapted from items
in the World Values Survey and the European Social Survey
(Ylä-Anttila, 2011). Economic attitudes were measured with
four items: “Public services should be evermore privatized,”
“If a situation arises in which it is necessary to either cut
down on public services and social security benefits or raise
taxes, raising taxes is the better option” (reverse scored),
“Large income differences are acceptable, as an appropriate
reward for differences of talent and dedication,” and “In
the long run, the current levels of public service and social
security benefits burden the public budget too much.” Each
item was responded to on a scale from one (completely
disagree) to five (completely agree), where higher numbers
indicate more right-oriented responses. The mean score was
2.632 (SD = 1.012). Cronbach’s alpha internal consistency
reliability was 0.800.
Social attitudes were measured with four items: “Gay and
lesbian couples should have the same marriage and adoption
rights as heterosexual couples” (reverse scored), “If the state offers
to set up a refugee center in my home municipality, the offer
should be accepted” (reverse scored), “School is too indulgent
toward pupils. Stricter discipline would make schools better,”
and “Traditional values, such as family values, religion, and
patriotism, provide a sound basis for politics.” Each item was
responded to on a scale from one (completely disagree) to five
(completely agree). The higher the number, the more conservative
the responses. The mean score was 2.718 (SD = 1.019) and
alpha was 0.747.
The items that we employed to measure the psychological
underpinnings of political attitudes were included in the VAA
hosted by the Finnish national broadcasting company YLE. The
length of the questionnaire had been set to thirty items, of
which six were allocated to the measurement of psychologically
relevant variables that could be expected to underlie political
attitudes. Due to these space constrains set by YLE we could
not use pre-existing scales, but were allowed to create, in
close collaboration with journalists, six relatively simple, socially
appropriate, and short items that would be interesting to those
completing the measures and to readers, meaning that the
items not be very similar to each other. These restrictions ruled
out the possibility to use well-established multi-item scales.
Instead, we tried to approach RWA and SDO – perhaps the
two currently most popular individual difference predictors
of political ideology – from various theoretical perspectives,
with the intention of covering the breadth of the constructs
rather than striving to maximize internal consistency reliability
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(this approach is often advocated in the development of short
measures; e.g., Gosling et al., 2003; McCrae et al., 2011).
The possible precursors or psychological underpinnings
of political attitudes were measured with six items that
were responded to on a five-point scale ranging from −2
(completely disagree) to 2 (completely agree). The items were
based on previous scales designed to assess the psychological
underpinnings of political ideology, but we selected them and
modified them to take into consideration the public nature of the
responses. In essence, we sought to create items the responses to
which would not be dictated too strongly by social desirability
concerns (this meant excluding items assessing, e.g., preference
for violent maintenance of oppressive hierarchies, blatant forms
of dehumanization, racism).
The six items are presented in Table 1. Also presented are
the item loadings from a three-factor solution that accounted
for 66,099% of the total variance (maximum likelihood factor
analysis with varimax rotation), with the three first factors
explaining 29.606, 20.094, and 16.399% of the variance (the
number of factors was determined by parallel analysis).
The first factor was labeled SDO – Anti-egalitarianism. The
subtle, hierarchy-enhancing beliefs (i.e., meritocratic beliefs)
that load highly on this factor manifest an affinity to
ideologies and policies that maintain inequality. The second
factor, representing submissiveness to rules as well as to
rulers, was labeled Authoritarian Conventionalism. The third
factor, with high loading of the two items that emphasized
reluctance to compromise and the need to fight, was labeled
Authoritarian Aggression.
Computation of Alignment Between
Economic and Social Attitudes
Asendorpf (1990, 1992) showed that the overall Pearson
correlation between two variables can be decomposed into the
individual contributions of each of the pairs of scores from
which a correlation is computed. In our case this means that
the contribution of each individual candidate’s combination of
economic and social attitudes to the overall correlation between
economic and social attitudes could be computed. I.e., those
individuals who occupy approximately the same rank on the
scales of economic and social attitudes will contribute strongly
to the overall correlation, whereas those individuals who occupy
very different ranking positions contribute less, or negatively, to
the overall correlation. The index that reflects each individual’s
contribution, referred to as rA, is computed according to the
Asendorpf (1992) formula: rA= 1 − (zEco−zSoc)2 /2, where zEco
and zSoc are z-scores for economic attitude and social attitude
ratings standardized across the sample (this makes the index
more robust to the non-normality of data). The mean of these rA
coefficients is equal to the Pearson product moment correlation
between the two dimensions.
RESULTS
The Relation Between Economic and
Social Attitudes
To illustrate the association between economic and social
attitudes, we plotted social attitudes as a function of economic
attitudes after first dividing the sample into deciles according
to the latter. Inspection of Figure 1 shows that those on the
economic left also tend to be rather liberal in terms of social
attitudes. By contrast, those on the right appear to be freer
to choose their social attitudes – the mean scores of even the
right-most deciles in terms of economic attitudes fall around
the mid-point of the social conservatism scale. A similar pattern
can be seen in Figure 2, which depicts economic attitudes as
a function of social conservatism. The more liberal tend to be
rather left-wing, but the socially conservative appear not to be
similarly constrained in terms of their economic attitudes. Thus,
being economically right-oriented does not require that one is
also socially conservative, or vice versa. On the other hand,
those on the economic left tend to be rather socially liberal, and
those who are socially liberal tend to be rather left in terms of
economic attitudes.
The correlations shown in Table 2 confirm what visual
inspection of Figures 1, 2 already suggested. The correlation
between right-wing economic attitudes and social conservatism
TABLE 1 | Descriptives of items pertaining to SDO and RWA and their loadings on three factors.







In Finland everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness. −0.324 (1.275) 0.628 −0.104 0.122
If people were treated more equally we would have fewer
problems in this country.
1.229 (1.036) −0.516 −0.245 −0.104
Things were not better before. Our way of living has
changed for the better.
0.731 (1.068) 0.071 −0.527 −0.172
It is more important for children to be curious and
independent than well-behaved and obedient.
0.438 (1.152) −0.131 −0.465 −0.061
What our country really needs is strong leadership that can
solve problems without the need to compromise.
−0.534 (1.275) 0.039 0.115 0.498
All life is basically a competition for power and resources.
To succeed one has to fight.
0.094 (1.236) 0.306 0.125 0.497
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FIGURE 1 | Social attitudes with 95% CIs as a function of deciles of economic attitudes.
was r = 0.410. This implies that the political elite, even
in the Finnish context in which the mass public organizes
their political attitudes on two independent dimensions, will
tend to organize their political attitudes on two moderately
aligned dimensions. Moreover, the correlation between these
dimensions is more strongly driven by those on the left and
those more liberal: correlations and partial correlations (age
and sex removed) between the Asendorpf index and being
on the right and being conservative ranged from around
r =−0.17 to r =−0.20.
Besides suggesting, as expected, that it is particularly those
on the left and those socially liberal among whom the two
dimensions of political attitudes are interrelated, Figures 1, 2
further suggest that it is particularly those who are furthest
to the left that are the most liberal. To investigate this, we
explored the extent to which the association between the two
dimensions is curvilinear. More specifically, we ran a regression
analysis in which we predicted right-wing orientation with
both conservatism and with conservatism squared, entered at
steps 1 and 2 of the regression analysis, respectively. Adding
conservatism squared to the regression analysis increased the
amount of explained variance from adjusted R2 = 0.168 (Step 1)
to adjusted R2 = 0.205 (Step 2). This change of 0.36 in adjusted
R2 was statistically significant [F change (1,9512) = 435.275,
p < 0.001] and both the linear (β = 1.425; t = 28.790) and
quadratic (β = −1.033; t = 20.863) terms were statistically
significant at step 2 of the regression analysis (both p < 0.001).
Similarly, in the prediction of conservatism, adding right-wing
orientation squared to right-wing orientation added the amount
of explained variance from adjusted R2 = 0.168 (Step 1) to
adjusted R2 = 0.192 (Step 2). This change of 0.024 in adjusted
R2 was statistically significant [F change (1,9512) = 282.002,
p < 0.001] and both the linear (β = 1.227; t = 24.778) and
quadratic (β = −0.832; t = 16.793) terms were statistically
significant at step 2 (both p < 0.001). These exploratory
regression analyses confirmed the existence of the type of
curvilinear quadratic effect that is suggested by Figures 1, 2; it
appears it is particularly those that are very far to the left (liberal)
that are the most socially liberal (left).
Concerning the psychological underpinnings of political
attitudes, right-wing economic attitudes were strongly correlated
with SDO Anti-egalitarianism (r = 0.593) and moderately
correlated with Authoritarian Aggression (r = 0.299), but not
at all with Authoritarian Conventionalism (r = 0.004). Social
conservatism, on the other hand, was moderately correlated
with both Authoritarian Conventionalism and Authoritarian
Aggression (r = 0.457 and r = 0.463, respectively), but
also with SDO Anti-egalitarianism (r = 0.363). This pattern
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FIGURE 2 | Economic attitudes with 95% CIs as a function of deciles of social attitudes.
of results generally conforms to the dual-process model of
political attitudes, according to which SDO underlies right-wing
economics attitudes and RWA socially conservative attitudes.
DISCUSSION
Arguably the most important finding of the present research
was that even in multi-party system in which the masses
organize their political attitudes on two independent dimensions,
these two dimensions tend to be moderately correlated among
the political elite, and that this alignment is driven by those
on the (far) left and the socially (very) liberal. Another
important finding was that the currently popular dual-process
model of political ideology can help understand not only
the political ideology of the masses, but also that of the
political elite.
Our results suggest that the association between economic
right-wing orientation and social conservatism, or, to even
greater extent, between left-wing economic orientation and social
liberalism, may be more intrinsic than is sometimes argued. More
precisely, our results can be interpreted as challenging accounts
that suggest these associations to be purely contextual results of
particular historical processes (e.g., Lienesch, 1982; Dionne, 1991;
Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2005). Our results can also be
interpreted as challenging accounts according to which other
constellations, such as that between economic left-wing attitudes
and social conservatism to be more coherent (e.g., Malka et al.,
2017). Our results also suggest that although the political elite
may in several ways be more rational in their decision-making
than the mass public (e.g., less prone to certain judgment and
decision-making biases; for a review, see Hafner-Burton et al.,
2013), their political attitudes are in part based on underlying
psychological motivations.
The Relation Between Economic and
Social Attitudes
The relatively strong correlation between economic right-wing
orientation and social conservatism could be considered
surprising – the space of West European politics has in recent
decades become clearly two-dimensional (Bornschier, 2010) and
the correlation between the two dimensions is virtually zero
in more representative samples of Finns (Malka et al., 2017).
Thus, even in a multi-party system and in a context in which
the masses organize their political attitudes on separate and
very distinct economic and social dimensions, the political elite
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TABLE 2 | Correlations and partial correlations between all variables.
2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
(1) Sex 0.050 −0.133 0.108 0.033 0.133 0.193 0.112 −0.017 0.139 −0.084
(2) Age 0.151 0.289 0.275 −0.009 0.133 −0.063 0.070 0.016 0.031
(3) Education 0.323 0.094 0.050 −0.132 0.022 −0.106 −0.122 0.051
(4) Income 0.311 0.246 0.230 0.028 0.168 −0.091 0.006 −0.015
(5) Experience 0.058 0.179 0.050 0.044 0.009 −0.030 −0.022 0.027
(6) Right-wing −0.141 −0.036 0.001 0.410 0.593 0.040 0.299 −0.197
(7) Conservative 0.063 0.225 0.047 0.424 0.363 0.457 0.463 −0.177
(8) SDO Anti-egalitarianism 0.044 0.174 0.033 0.586 0.379 0.041 0.253 −0.112
(9) RWA conventionalism −0.141 −0.117 −0.049 0.063 0.467 −0.049 0.261 −0.034
(10) RWA aggression −0.116 −0.014 −0.038 0.295 0.467 0.261 0.274 −0.110
(11) rA 0.033 −0.022 0.016 −0.226 −0.185 −0.121 −0.043 −0.127
Numbers below the diagonal are partial correlations with age and sex partialled out. Sex was coded 0 = Female, 1 = Male. rA is the Asendorpf index and indicates the
extent to which economic and social attitudes are aligned. N varies between 9342 and 9515, except for correlations that involved Income (n varied around 7000) or
Education (n varied around 8400). Correlations larger than 0.03, 0.04, and 0.05 are significant at p = 0.01, 0.001, and 0.0001, respectively.
organizes their economic and social attitudes more along a
single dimension.
Our results on the relation between economic and social
attitudes are consistent with results obtained in the United States,
according to which alignment between the economic and
social dimensions is conditional on a person’s level of political
engagement – the cultural and economic attitudes of the more
politically engaged are more strongly aligned (Sidanius and
Duffy, 1988; Federico and Schneider, 2007). However, our results
may require a different type of explanation than the one often
referred to in the United States context. In the United States
two-party system, the politically engaged have been argued to
align their views to their party’s position on most if not all
issues, as a consequence of which one dimension will suffice to
describe individual differences in political attitudes. It is less clear
why, in a multi-party Western European system such as Finland,
the two dimensions would be more strongly aligned among
the politically engaged. That the correlation between the two
dimensions was driven by those on the left and those more liberal
could, we believe, offer some clues for why these dimensions
may often be correlated among the politically engaged. I.e., those
on the economic left tend to have stronger equality concerns.
A frequent reason for people to sympathize with the left is
a perception of the world as unfair – inequality is perceived
as illegitimate and unjustified (Jost and Hunyady, 2002; Jost
et al., 2003). Moreover, those on the left are more likely to
interpret inequalities as the result of structural factors such as
discrimination, stereotyping, and exclusion from social networks
(e.g., Gurin, 1985; Major and Schmader, 2001). This means
that inequality in the economic sphere is intertwined with
inequality in the social sphere. Forms of economic inequality,
such as between management and labor, the rich and the poor,
corporations and consumers, thus becomes interwoven with
forms of social inequality, such as between white and black, men
and women, migrants and natives. The dismantling of one type
of inequality, be it economic or social, requires the dismantling
of the other type of inequality.
The above line of reasoning implies that for left-wing
people, concerns about economic injustice could be expected
to motivate more liberal social attitudes; i.e., views according
to which people should be treated similarly regardless of, for
instance, religious affiliation, societal status, cultural background,
ethnicity, sexual preferences, or gender. This could happen
because left-wing people tend to value equality per se, because
they tend to see social and economic injustices as intertwined
(e.g., Gurin, 1985; Major and Schmader, 2001), or both.
Researchers with data that includes measures of political attitudes
and measures of moral concerns, such as measures based on
moral foundations theory (Graham et al., 2011) or on Schwartz
(1992); Schwartz et al. (2012) theory of human values, could
more explicitly test the idea that equality concerns have a
role to play in explaining the relation between economic and
social attitudes.
An unexpected finding was that it is particularly those who
were very far to the left (very liberal) that were liberal (to the left).
This pattern could be driven by general response style – those
who provided extreme responses to the items concerning
economic attitudes may be more likely to do so also in the domain
of social attitudes – or it could be a more substantive effect. Even
in an elite sample, in which everyone can be presumed to be high
in both political knowledge and engagement, those furthest to
the economic left or those most socially liberal may be the most
knowledgeable or most engaged, leading to stronger alignment
between the two dimensions of political attitudes (Sidanius and
Duffy, 1988; Federico and Schneider, 2007). Whether this effect
replicates in other contexts and its causes should be interesting
topics for future research.
The Dual Model Process of Political
Ideology
In the last decades, SDO and RWA have been among the
constructs that have attracted the most research attention in
terms of understanding the psychological underpinnings of
political attitudes. The dual-process model suggests that SDO
may underlie a preference for right-wing economic attitudes,
and RWA a preference for socially conservative attitudes.
Such findings have been reported in other Western European
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contexts (e.g., Duckitt et al., 2002; Duriez and Van Hiel, 2002;
Duriez et al., 2005; Cizmar et al., 2014) and our results are
largely consistent with these findings: SDO Anti-egalitarianism
was strongly correlated with right-wing economic attitudes,
and Authoritarian Conventionalism and Aggression were both
moderately correlated with social conservatism. However, two
further findings require comment.
SDO Anti-egalitarianism was not only strongly associated
with right wing-economic views, but also moderately strongly
associated with social conservatism. This could be considered
surprising given that Finland is often considered a Nordic
welfare state in which democracy has at least historically
restrained the power of capital and income inequality is
low. Anti-egalitarian people could thus be expected to
yearn for change rather than for maintaining the social
fabric. However, for almost three decades now, Finnish
governments have pursued a neoliberal doctrine and pushed
for the restructuring of the role of the state in a manner
highly sympathetic toward the views of the business elite.
The continuing rise in income inequality and the ongoing
dismantling of the welfare state may predispose those
with an anti-egalitarian bent to be rather happy with the
current status quo.
The second finding that could be considered unexpected was
that Authoritarian Aggression was associated not only with social
conservatism, but also with right-wing economic views. It seems
possible that people endorsing these rather aggressive views
could, as formulated by sociologist Arlie Hochschild (2016),
feel that while they work hard, others, usually immigrants and
minorities, are cutting in line, which leads to anger and outrage
toward a political system that is seen as favoring others. Such
feelings could be expected to be especially accentuated in a
well-fare state such as Finland that redistributes resources to
the poor, and manifest in political rhetoric and policies that
call for dismantling social welfare programs. To the best of our
knowledge, Authoritarian Aggression has not in other samples
been associated with economic right-orientation. However, in
Sweden, also a welfare state, low regard for Fairness and Harm
considerations was reported to be associated with opposition
to equality and with placing oneself as right-wing on a scale
that assessed political orientation (Nilsson and Erlandsson,
2015). This may not be true in other contexts. For instance,
in a United States sample, a measure of dogmatic aggression
toward those with other beliefs and values was correlated only
with social conservatism, not right-wing economical orientation
(Crowson, 2009). Nevertheless, the current results obtained
from Finland and the previous results from Sweden together
suggest that the more aggressive aspects of authoritarianism
may in welfare states be associated with right-wing economic
attitudes. This can be considered rather surprising, as neither
the Finnish nor Swedish populist parties, both of which employ
discourses that aim to protect the welfare state from the drain
of immigration, tend to question the redistributive welfare state
per se (Nordensvard and Ketola, 2015). Alleviating fears that
undeserving groups, such as migrants, are taking advantage
of the welfare state could help both curtail aggressiveness
toward these groups and increase support for the welfare
state. Particularly economic arguments for the necessity of
immigration in upholding the welfare state could be effective in
combatting authoritarian aggressiveness.
Limitations and Conclusion
Perhaps the most obvious limitation of the present research was
our reliance on only six items to measure various aspects of SDO
and RWA. It would have been highly interesting to include also
items that tapped into, for instance, SDO Dominance, but this
was not possible due to the restrictions set by the VAA provider
and also due to fear that social desirability concerns would drive
responses to items with very blatant content.
Regarding generalizability, our sample consisted of candidates
seeking political office. The sample must be considered biased
in many ways. Willingness to join a political organization and
run for public office expresses not only a high level of political
engagement, but may also express, e.g., a greater need for prestige
or power, a wish to help others, or a desire to be in the public eye.
The demographic data suggest that our sample was somewhat
better off than the general population, but the psychological
differences may well be much more pronounced.
Despite the above limitations, our results allow us to conclude
that (a) even in a context in which the structuring of political
spaces among the masses is clearly two-dimensional (Malka
et al., 2017), economic and social attitudes are more aligned
among the political elite, (b) the moderate alignment between
the two dimensions is due to those on the economical left
being more socially liberal and vice versa, and (c) various
aspects of SDO and RWA underlie right-wing economic
attitudes and social conservatism, respectively. Recent reviews
and meta-analyses of the field have suggested that the relations
between underlying psychological dispositions and political
attitudes vary considerably based on contextual factors (Federico
and Malka, 2018). Our results are consistent with these ideas,
lending support to the idea that results from research conducted
with the mass public cannot be generalized to the political elite.
Moreover, the associations between psychological constructs,
such as SDO and RWA, and the holding of political attitudes
may vary from context to context. Before any generalizations can
be drawn, we need much more samples from diverse contexts.
This is also true for our findings regarding the alignment
between economic and social attitudes. Above we argue for
a certain coherence between being economically left-wing and
socially liberal – both being left and being liberal may be
driven by underlying equality concerns. However, whether
such an alignment between these dimensions can be found in
other contexts, particularly non-Western contexts, needs to be
investigated in future research.
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